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IISSS - SKOPJE

Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies

The International Institute for Strategic and Security Studies (IISSS) - Radika, headquartered in Skopje, is an independent think tank established in 2021 and rebranded in 2024. It operates as a vital resource for the government and society, providing comprehensive research and analysis to guide informed decision-making on national and international policies.IISSS emphasizes policies that uphold national sovereignty, cultural heritage, and the principles of freedom, fostering a society where economic opportunity, individual liberty, and cultural identity coexist harmoniously. By offering strategic insights and advocating for policies that protect the nation’s core values and interests, IISSS seeks to establish clear frameworks in the national strategy, ensuring stability and resilience against political and ideological changes.

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Policy Research & Strategic Analysis

Conduct in-depth research on national security, defense, and foreign policy issues. Analyze the implications of European and global trends on North Macedonia’s defense and national security. Produce regular policy briefs, research reports, and recommendations to guide decision-makers.

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Organize seminars, conferences, and public discussions on necessary approaches to modern challenges. Build partnerships with other think tanks, organizations, and political leaders to influence the European policy agenda.

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Ensure that the national interest remains at the core of all strategic decisions, with a focus on preserving North Macedonia’s sovereignty, cultural identity & security in times of global shifts.

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Establish educational programs, training workshops, and internships to develop the next generation of leaders and policy experts

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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - www.unodc.org

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IISSS - SKOPJE

Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies

The guiding principles of The Association for research, analysis, and public policy “The Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies (IISSS) - Radika, are founded on independence, public engagement and transparency, nonprofit orientation, nonpartisanship, and active initiatives in public life. These values ensure the association operates with integrity, accountability, and a commitment to fostering meaningful contributions to society

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Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies (IISSS)Effective Date: 01.01.2025
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Members

Dr. Kiril MinoskiDr. Kiril Minoski is a distinguished expert in strategic management, public finance, and institutional reform, bringing a unique blend of academic achievement and professional experience to his role as a member of the presidency of the Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies (IISSS). With a PhD in Economics from the University St. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, Dr. Minoski has authored numerous analyses in the field of economics, offering valuable insights into fiscal policy, economic development, and organizational transformation.Professionally, he has held prominent positions in both the public and private sectors. As a former Minister of Finance and Director of the Tax Agency, Dr. Minoski spearheaded critical reforms in public finance management, institutional capacity building, and strategic planning. His leadership extended to high-impact roles in international development, including working with organizations like the World Bank, European Union, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on transformative projects.Dr. Minoski's private-sector experience includes his tenure with the globally renowned consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, where he contributed to initiatives in economic competitiveness, export development, and private-sector advancement. As the President of the Change Management Association, Dr. Minoski has championed organizational adaptability and efficiency. He also served as a member of the Steering Committee of the Society for Macedonian Israeli Friendship, further exemplifying his commitment to fostering collaboration and international relations.Dr. Minoski’s multidisciplinary expertise and strategic vision make him an invaluable contributor to the institute, advancing innovative approaches to strategic and security challenges on a global scale

Amb. Ivica BocevskiIvica Bocevski is a Macedonian diplomat and politician. He served as a Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs and as the Spokesperson for the Government. In a diplomatic capacity, he represented his country as the first Macedonian Ambassador to Brazil and Latin America, as the diplomatic advisor to the President of the Republic, and as a researcher in the research and analysis department of the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.His areas of interest are democratization, European integration, regional cooperation initiatives in the region of the Balkans, conflict and post-conflict societies, managing diverse societies, multilateralism in the 21st century, migrations, international affairs, and the new concepts of citizenship.He is a syndicated columnist for several Macedonian and regional publications and holds a B.A. in political science from the University of Skopje and a Master of Public and International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh (recipient of the prestigious Ron Brown Fellowship of the US State Department)."

Prof. Dalibor JovanovskiThroughout his academic career, Jovanovski has published several books as an author and co-author. He has also contributed to many textbooks and teaching materials for primary and secondary education. His publications span various countries, including Macedonia, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, he has presented his research at numerous academic and professional conferences across Europe and beyond.Graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of History, earned his master’s degree in 2000 and his PhD in 2003. Since 1997, he has been affiliated with the Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of History. Jovanovski held editorial roles in prominent historical journals, including History and the Macedonian Historical Review. He currently serves as the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Annual Proceedings of the Faculty of Philosophy and is a member of the international editorial boards of Along Clio’s Ways (University of Koper, Slovenia) and the Annals of the “Ovidius” University of Constanța – History Series.Jovanovski's research focuses on the history of the Balkan peoples, with particular emphasis on the diplomacy of Balkan states, geostrategic issues in the region, the intellectual contributions of historical figures, and their roles in shaping contemporary national identities and nationalisms in the Balkans. He currently serves as the Head of the Department of History at the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje.His international collaborations include partnerships with institutions such as the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences (Athens), Purdue University, Columbia University, and the Creative Europe program. He also serves as an evaluator for the National Research, Development and Innovation Office in Hungary.Beyond his academic contributions, Jovanovski is actively engaged in promoting historical scholarship related to Macedonia and the Balkans. He has authored numerous documentary programs and opinion columns on historical topics. He has also delivered public lectures on various aspects of history as part of his broader societal engagement.From 2010 to 2019, Jovanovski was a member of the Council for International Relations of the President of the Republic of Macedonia, Gjorge Ivanov. Between 2014 and 2019, he served on the Presidential Commission for Decorations. Currently he is a member of the joint Macedonian Greek Commission for History and Archaeology.

Prof. Zhidas DaskalovskiZhidas Daskalovski has a PhD from the Political Science Department, Central European University. He has published numerous scholarly articles on politics in the Southeast European region, and Macedonia country reports for Freedom House/Nations in Transit, Open Budget Index, Global Integrity Report, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, UNDP People Centred Analysis, UN Human Development Report, Berghof Foundation, Regional Cooperation Council.A professor at the Faculty of Security-Skopje, University of “St. Kliment Ohridski”. Daskalovski held the Lord Dahrendorf Fellowship at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, the UCL/School of Slavonic and East European Studies Macedonian Studies Fellowship, and the Social Science Research Council/ Ethnobarometer Fellowship at the University of North Carolina. Since 2015 he is the Macedonian Public advocate of REKOM for the establishment of an official Regional Commission tasked with establishing the facts about the war crimes and other serious human rights violations committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the period from 1 January 1991 through to 31 December 2001.Since 2023, Daskalovski is full member of Group of independent experts (GIE) on the European Charter of local self-government. Founder of CRPM, and current Director of the Council of Europe supported School of Public Policy “Mother Teresa”. He Currently holds the position of foreign policy advisor for the current Macedonian president Gordana Siljanovska Davkova.

Rabi W. SedrakRabi W. Sédrak is a consultant for governmental reforms, with over 18 years of experience in Europe and MENA region. Over the past 11 years, he managed and participated in the implementation of over 20 governmental reforms projects in Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Kuwait.Sédrak has released several publications and lectures at the NATO Defense College foundation, School of Public Service, the Institute for Security Research, the Center for Security Research, Institute for European Studies, and the School of Political Studies at the Council of Europe; his research interests include illegal immigration, terrorism & counterterrorism with an emphasis on al Qaeda and ISIS, radicalization and EU Security. In 2012, he designed the Balkan Integration & Immigration Program (BIIP), a tool to control and integrate the waves of immigration that hit Europe in 2011 following the Syrian civil war. His latest publication “Black Sea and Balkans Perspectives” – Published by NATO Foundation and sponsored by NATO Diplomacy Division.Sédrak holds a BS in engineering, BA in security studies and post graduate studies in security, counterterrorism and international law. Throughout the years, Sédrak received top tiers honors and awards for his services from many countries in Europe, Americas, and MENA region; including several Letters of Commendation from the United States Navy, the U.S. Department of Defense, and other significant certifications from the United States of America and France.

Academic & Honorary Members

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Eliminating clientelism is the first and most important goal for Macedonia!

Prof. Zhidas Daskalovski

There’s no politics here—you will all answer, all of you who dared to conduct politics in this way, on the backs of citizens and the lives these children lost, and there will be no mercy. We will drag them out of their homes if they think they can play the ethnic card and engage in politicking with those midnight press conferences. We will pull them out by their ears from their homes—they need to know this, said Hristijan Mickoski. I support the Prime Minister’s statement. After the fourth major tragedy—Durmo Tours, Besa Trans, the modular hospital in Tetovo—there must now be accountability and a system reset. Since even the leader of the opposition SDSM, Venko Filipche, demands a complete and objective investigation and that no one should be spared—neither current nor former officials nor employees—the situation is clear: clientelism and impunity must be eradicated immediately.In Macedonia, clientelism is the biggest and most urgent challenge in the process of building democratic and transparent institutions. Although we all know what it is, let’s repeat: clientelism is a political and social system in which people in positions of power (such as politicians, officials, or business patrons) offer and provide privileges, resources, services, or protection to individuals or groups with less power (clients) in exchange for their loyalty, votes, or other forms of support. Citizens rely on informal networks instead of laws and procedures. The system is not based on effort, knowledge, or merit, but on personal or party interests. Employment choices are not made through transparent competitions. The costs of public procurements are not easily tracked, and if there are shortcomings, there’s no accountability. State Audit Office reports are just words on paper.In Macedonia, clientelism also has an external dimension where politicians, out of loyalty to other politicians (Brussels, for example), openly disregard laws because they have the support of powerful foreign figures. In return, they steer the country’s foreign—or, less often, domestic—policy according to the directives of those foreign powers. This system undermines equality, weakens democracy, and encourages corrupt behavior because people and businesses depend on political connections rather than their own abilities and competencies. Politicians use this system to maintain their power—if they control jobs, tenders, subsidies, or social aid, they can “secure” voter loyalty.Family and party connections and interests cannot be more important than laws, rules, or the common good. Parties cannot reward their supporters with job positions, tenders, or other benefits while expecting loyalty in return. The consequences of clientelism are corruption, weakening of institutions, and economic stratification—illegal hiring in the public sector, awarding tenders, subsidies, and other privileges given to individuals or companies close to the ruling parties or political power brokers. Party-based hiring of unqualified people demotivates all those who are qualified but lack “connections.” Over time, the institution becomes inefficient, and citizens suffer from poor services.In public procurement, often the company that wins the tender isn’t the most qualified but is chosen due to its loyalty to a political official. To secure a tender, the company pays bribes, hires people recommended by the patron, or donates part of the profit back to the party (through “legal” donations or sponsorships). The service is overpriced, and taxpayers’ money is spent inefficiently. Companies with few or no employees or without experience win million-dollar contracts, while serious companies without “connections” are ignored. As a result, the school, hall, or road being built or renovated is of questionable quality.In Macedonian society, clientelism is deeply rooted historically. Even in communism, there were privileged elites who used the levers of power. It existed in royal Yugoslavia and even in the Ottoman Empire within the millet system and the propaganda of neighbors. Phrases like “well, everyone does it” or “if you don’t help your own, who will?” are not accidental. Clientelism is like a “vicious or closed circle”—those in power use it to stay in power, and those who depend on it have no incentive to abandon it. Those in the opposition will do everything to gain a ruling position and enter the circle, and so on. The ultimate result of clientelism is corruption that is destroying our nation. Citizens are emigrating or dying in accidents. The Prime Minister will achieve a true revolution if he topples the system that doesn’t function justly, if he crushes clientelism. We can discuss how to tackle clientelism, but we cannot and must not dispute that it needs to be eradicated immediately.Furthermore, given that there are typical problems related to corruption and political/party influence on the independence of public institutions, the media, and the electoral processes, Macedonia should immediately focus on strengthening the independence and the competencies of several public institutions that can influence the mentioned problematic areas. These include, the State Audit Office, the Media Regulatory Body, the Public Broadcasting Service, (MRT), the Ombudsperson Office, the Public Prosecutor, the Anti-corruption Commission, the State Electoral Commission, and the Commission for Protection from Discrimination. One could envision a system of election/appointment of officials in these bodies through a consensual vote in the parliament where for example the nominations would be confirmed by a strong majority and the candidates would have very strong qualifications. Among other things, the strengthening of the efficacy and the role of the mentioned institutions will in the short run influence the fairness of elections. Conducting free and fair elections, whereby voting will not be disputed by any party, should be a priority for the near future.A key aspect of this engagement is to improve monitoring and evaluation of public policymaking in general. Macedonia should move from traditional monitoring which focuses on implementation monitoring, i.e. tracking inputs (money, resources, strategies), activities (what actually took place) and outputs (the products or services produced). This approach focuses on monitoring how well a project, programme or policy is being implemented, and is often used to assess compliance with work plans and budget. The government should begin using results-based monitoring, which involves the regular collection of information on the public policy performance. Results-based monitoring demonstrates whether a given law, programme or policy is achieving its stated goals. However, this should not be used as an incentive for further enlargement of the public administration but should be performed through reforming its present capacities and efficiency to fit the new results-based monitoring approach. This approach is in line with the EU accession strategy as the union repeatedly calls in all progress reports for the country output legitimacy to be strengthened rather than just focusing on the input legitimacy of decisions. It will inevitably need establishment of a monitoring and evaluation framework that is currently lacking, as well as acquiring certain sets of skills of civil servants as well as level of knowledge and awareness of public managers for results – based monitoring framework to be enforced.

The Great Powers and the Balkans: Geopolitics of Interest Through a Historical Lens

Prof. Dalibor Jovanovski

When Napoleon invaded Egypt - nominally still part of the powerful Ottoman Empire - no one in Istanbul imagined that processes would soon begin in another part of the empire, the Balkans, which would inevitably lead to a gradual withdrawal from the region and increased involvement of the major European powers. In fact, the two Serbian uprisings of 1804 and 1815, along with the Greek uprising of 1821, opened the door for the Great Powers of Europe to intervene in the Ottoman-controlled Balkans, marking the beginning of their lasting engagement in the region. Under the pretext of restoring order, what truly lay behind their involvement were the strategic interests of these powers.However, intervention did not imply unity among the powers - Russia, Britain, and France at that time - as each had differing interests in the region, which was of essential geopolitical and geo-economics importance. The powers' actions in the Balkans sometimes seem illogical from a historical point of view, yet perfectly reasonable in hindsight. For example, during Egypt’s military successes against the Ottomans, Russia supported its Ottoman adversary by deploying troops to Asia Minor to stop Egyptian advances - despite having signed a peace treaty with the Ottomans just four years earlier. This support came with conditions: the Ottomans had to sign the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833, which effectively made them dependent on St. Petersburg. This, in turn, triggered counter-moves by London and Paris to curb Russian influence.
Britain had significant strategic interests in the Ottoman Empire due to its control over key land and sea routes to India, and these only deepened throughout the 19th century, especially as a new power - Germany - began aligning with the Ottoman state.Today, we continue to witness analysis and debates regarding the involvement of great powers in the internal affairs of Balkan states. Yet this is nothing new. The internal political struggle in Greece among the so-called pro-Russian, pro-British, and pro-French factions, backed by the respective representatives of these great powers, ultimately led to the gradual marginalization of pro-Russian influence within Greek society. When it came to securing their interests, the powers were not shy about demonstrating military might: in 1855, Britain and France blockaded the port of Piraeus and imposed a prime minister of their choosing. During the Crimean War, in order to protect the Ottoman state from Russia, they also thwarted any Greek attempts to exploit the situation. On the other hand, the transfer of the Ionian Islands in 1864, which had been under British administration since 1815, was intended to further consolidate British influence in Greece. Although Greece was a small and economically marginal state at the time, its strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean rendered it geopolitically significant.. At times, the Great Powers acted together to prevent destabilization. In 1886, a joint naval blockade of the Greek coast led to the collapse of the Greek government. Eventually, the Greek political elite mostly aligned with Western powers, though they never completely closed the door to the East. Even today, Greece, while clearly Western-leaning, continues to view itself as a bridge between East and West - still grappling with the question of whether it belongs to one or the other.The conduct of the European powers exhibited the similar patterns across the other Balkan nations. Serbia emerged under strong Russian diplomatic pressure, and Bulgaria was created through direct war with the Ottoman Empire. Although Russia played a key role in securing Serbia's autonomy, relations with the first Serbian prince rapidly deteriorated. Such support did not imply a convergence of interests. This facilitated the gradual entrenchment of Austrian, and later Austro-Hungarian, influence in Serbia, along with, to a lesser extent, French and British interests. Each of these powers had its own rationale for involvement. Vienna, as the capital of a declining empire, viewed the Balkans as a region of strategic survival, initially from an economic perspective, and later from a political one. The disintegration of Austro-Hungary underscored this reality. Consequently, this dynamic also precipitated divisions within Serbian society, particularly among the political elites, with factions aligning themselves with Vienna, St. Petersburg, and, later, Paris and London. An intriguing episode concerning British interests in Serbia is the 1903 coup and the assassination of the royal couple from the Obrenović dynasty, followed by their replacement with a representative of the Karađorđević dynasty. London was reluctant to recognize the dynastic change on the Serbian throne until 1906, a shift that coincided with Great Britain's entry into the Triple Entente with Russia and France, due to the increasingly probable conflict with Imperial Germany. Today, the British royal family maintains godparental ties with the former Serbian, and later Yugoslav, Karađorđević royal family. However, this did not prevent Britain from offering parts of Macedonia—then under Serbian control—to Bulgaria, in an effort to secure Bulgaria's entry into World War I on the side of the Entente. Moreover, Britain did not hesitate to abandon General Mihailović, the commander of the Yugoslav Royal Army in the homeland, and instead supported Tito's partisans as the legitimate representatives of the resistance in Yugoslavia.It is undeniable that Russia created modern Bulgaria. It is indisputable that Bulgaria was established by Russia. The country’s national holiday commemorates the signing of the preliminary, though not final, agreement at San Stefano on March 3, 1878, between the victorious Russia and the defeated Ottoman Empire. Although the newly autonomous Bulgarian state was significantly smaller than what had been envisaged in the San Stefano treaty, owing to the interests of Western powers, the unification of Bulgaria with the autonomous region of Eastern Rumelia signaled the beginning of a cooling of relations with Russia and the emergence of pro-Western political elites in the country. Great Britain, which had been the staunchest opponent of the San Stefano treaty, recognized the unified Bulgaria once it became clear that Russia was no longer behind it. Russia, in turn, regained its position in the country in 1896 after recognizing Prince Ferdinand as the legitimate Bulgarian monarch, albeit under certain conditions. This set the stage for competition within Bulgaria, where new players such as Austria-Hungary and Germany emerged. The results were seen in the Balkan Wars and Bulgaria's involvement in World War I on the side of the Central Powers, as well as in World War II on the side of the Axis powers led by Nazi Germany. However, due to Soviet—some would say Russian—interests, Bulgaria became the only defeated country in World War II to emerge with a larger territory than it had before 1939. The division within Bulgarian society between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces was not visible during the communist regime or during Bulgaria’s membership in the anti-Western Warsaw Pact. After the fall of communism, these divisions resurfaced, of course, fueled by forces with differing geopolitical interests. Today, Bulgaria is a member of both NATO and the EU, yet the division within society remains evident, including on the political stage. Bulgaria's veto on Macedonia's EU accession places it in a precarious position, one that could be leveraged in a future geopolitical context.The only period of relative Balkan stability was during the Cold War, when Europe was split into two blocs. The Greek Civil War’s outcome - the victory of government forces — ensured the Yalta agreements remained intact. Tito’s break with Stalin led to the creation of a unique socialist system in Yugoslavia, which positioned itself between the East and West, though generally leaning toward the latter. Yet, the Cold War’s end and the fall of the USSR rendered Yugoslavia politically obsolete. The Yugoslav Wars (1991–2001) prompted major Western military and political intervention, but peace remains fragile. NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo ended the conflict and led to Kosovo’s secession — but also marked a turning point in Russia’s and China’s attitudes toward the West. Initially subtle, their opposition is now open and competitive, even hostile. The European Union allowed the initiation of the dispute over the name of the new Macedonian state, which had been a longstanding destabilizing factor for the Balkans, without adequately considering the repercussions of such a decision. As part of the efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.S. diplomacy exerted pressure on the governments in Skopje and Athens to sign the Interim Agreement in September 1995, marking the first phase toward a final resolution of the name dispute over Macedonia, which had been instigated by the Greek government. However, the agreement did not result in the full integration of Macedonia into Euro-Atlantic structures, as Athens vetoed Macedonia’s accession to NATO at the 2008 Bucharest summit. In many analytical circles, which lack sentimental attachment to President Trump, it is emphasized that during his first term, the Balkans were not a priority on his agenda. With the arrival of President Biden in the White House, it is argued that the United States has re-engaged with the region. However, is this truly the case? Notably, during President Trump’s first term, the Prespa Agreement was signed in 2018, marking the resolution of one phase of the Macedonian-Greek dispute, although challenges related to its implementation persist at a lower intensity. Additionally, in the fall of that year, the so-called Washington Agreement was signed in Washington, D.C., between Serbia and Kosovo—an agreement that Belgrade does not recognize, given its refusal to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence.Why is this so?
The geography of the Balkans has not changed since the early 19th century. The rivers still flow, the seas are the same, and ancient trade routes remain - now supplemented by modern roads, railways, and air routes. For many European countries, the Balkans is the nearest land and sea route to the Middle East, the gateway to the Black Sea for the West, and to the Adriatic and Mediterranean for Russia. Its proximity to Suez, the Caucasus, and Central Asia gives it immense strategic value. In short, the region is significant to great powers on three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. It may appear marginal, but its strategic location keeps it at the heart of geopolitical rivalries. That’s why external interference never ceases. The abundance of Western, American, and Russian literature on the Balkans confirms this enduring interest.The Balkan elites tend to view their narrative as accurate, asserting that their statehood was achieved through bloody struggles, and attributing the credit for this to their predecessors, along with the accompanying mythological construct of the nation, which, in the Balkan context, is universally shared. While this holds some truth, it would have been impossible without the support of one of the great powers, a fact that is reluctantly acknowledged. Conversely, the elites of the great powers downplay the significance of the events in the Balkans that enabled their interventions and allowed them to pursue their geopolitical and geo-economic interests, often manipulating intra-Balkan misunderstandings. It was in this context that the term “Balkanization” was coined, a term, unfortunately, still used today to describe the fragmentation of states, wars, and the economic, social, and cultural backwardness that ensues. These powers refuse to acknowledge that their involvement in the internal affairs of the Balkan states created a fertile ground for widespread clientelism, which remains a significant issue for all Balkan societies today, not only the so-called Western Balkans.What is clear is that this process continues. The weakening of one power or alliance invariably opens up space for the return of old players in the Balkans, while simultaneously paving the way for new ones, some of whom have never previously had a presence in the region. The presently ambiguous role of the United States in the region, with various analyses suggesting that the U.S. might either maintain or reduce its involvement in the Balkans, or shift its primary focus to the Pacific, creates an opening for new actors—some long-established, such as Russia and Turkey, and others like Italy, France, Germany, and Great Britain—along with a new economic player: China. The only real loser in this shifting dynamic is the increasingly weakened European Union, which continues to fail in establishing itself as a significant force in the region. This remains largely a theoretical position, as the EU has consistently delayed the integration of all Balkan countries into its structures. This situation prompts several questions for politicians in the Western Balkans regarding the EU: how was Greece accepted with a negative progress report, driven by the strategic interests of the then EEC ? How was Cyprus admitted, despite not controlling 40% of its own territory? And why is Ukraine on a fast track to integration while the countries of the Western Balkans are left waiting, frustrated and sidelined? The answer, it seems, lies in Brussels and, to some extent, Washington. The continued exclusion of the Western Balkan countries from the EU raises the question of whether this situation might create space for an alternative geopolitical strategy and a new regional geopolitical map, one that could lead to the further deterioration of already fragile, economically unstable, institutionally weak, clientelist, and corrupt states, vulnerable to external influences.

European Integration & Western Balkans - What's Next?

Amb. Ivica Bocevski

AbstractIs there a real perspective for the full integration of the Western Balkans Six in the European Union, or is the accession process already dead? “Something is rotten in the state of the European integration of the Western Balkans” is not just a poetic way to describe the state of affairs regarding full accession, but a reality. The European Union, and previously the European Economic Community, was quite efficient in previous cycles of European enlargement. Virtually all the accession processes were completed within the mandate of a single European Commission once the negotiation processes had been started with the respective countries. Furthermore, in the pre-accession period the European Union invested heavily in the removal of the “non-acquis political criteria,” which were usually linked to the democratic insufficiencies of the candidate countries. The only notable exceptions to the “rule of a single European Commission” are the Turkish enlargement and the Western Balkans Six (WB6) accession process. Given the fact that most of the WB6 countries already have the necessary legal framework in place for cooperation with the EU and that the single market is by far the largest trading partner of the region, the only logical conclusion is that there is no political will for further enlargement of the European Union, and so the accession process has ground to a halt.The European Union and Democratization
The democratic nature of the European Union and its member states is enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union. Article 2 of the Treaty stipulates that “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. That being said, is there a link between European integration and the democratization processes in its member states, candidates, and potential candidates? Can the EU project its democracy in its neighborhood and around the globe?The answer seems obvious because “no regional organization or influence has had a more powerful impact on democratization in its own neighborhood than the EU” (Larry Diamond, 2008). The EU was created from six Western European countries, which underwent thorough and substantial redemocratization in the aftermath of World War II, and all successful emerging Mediterranean democracies after the collapse of the southern dictatorships were admitted to the EU as full member states. Leo Tolstoy wrote in Anna Karenina that “happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way,” and at first sight it may seem that all the success stories of the post-communist democratic transitions are also alike, as they are now members of the European Union, while the undecided cases are at various stages in their journey towards European integration, and the failed post-communist democratizations are all unsuccessful in their own way, without any prospect of becoming members of the European Union.Actual evidence is, however, less than obvious, and as Sedelmeir concludes, “the link between democratization and European integration is not straightforward” because “it is not clear to which extent the EU actually had a causal influence and how its influence varied across countries and issues” and “even if the EU did have a causal impact, it is not obvious that its influence was always entirely positive for democracy in East Central Europe” (Sedelmeier, 2010).In their essence, the democratization processes in the Mediterranean and the post-communist countries confirm that “one of the firmest conclusions” was that “transitions from authoritarian rule and immediate prospects for political democracy [are] largely to be explained in terms of national forces and calculations” and that “external factors [tend] to play an indirect and usually marginal role, with the obvious exception of those instances when foreign occupying power was present”, as Philippe C. Schmitter writes in the most authoritative study on the democratization process, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in 1986. However, after the fifth enlargement of the European Union, there has been a steady inflation of scholarly articles in which the role of the “external factors of democratization” has been reassessed due to the successful European integration story of the post-communist ten that joined the European Union (Tolstoy’s happy families or Donald Rumsfeld’s “New Europe”) in 2004. Despite all the triumphalism of this tectonic historic event in contemporary European history, Philippe C. Schmitter’s argument is still rock solid when he claims that democratic transition and consolidation are primarily issues of domestic politics and can best be explained by following the micro and macro political vectors in every polity.However, the role of the European Union has to be re-evaluated, since throughout its history, this entity has played a decisive role in the democratic stabilization of the emerging European democracies, following their democratic transitions from authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The primary democratic role of the European Union in the domestic affairs of its constituent countries is “preventive", meaning that there has never been a case of complete democratic breakdown in any of the European member states. This specific role of the European Union was a by-product of its institutional development and the events of the wider geostrategic environment of the European continent. It confirms the postulates of the intergovernmentalist approach to the European Union, since the institutional development of the EU has led towards the broadest possible acceptance by the domestic national elites of the necessity to preserve the democratic regimes as a minimal condition for access to the common market and the other benefits provided by full membership.The attractiveness of the EU continues to motivate countries to apply for membership. However, none of these countries are seduced by the special Cytherean “soft power” of a European Venus, as Robert Kagan defines the European way of foreign policy (Kagan, 2004). The applicants’ positions result from a cold-blooded cost-benefit analysis, and even though their elites and societies are aware of the massive reform process necessary for full accession to take place, the final prize (full membership) far “outweighs the costs, particularly those of exclusion, that applicants make concessions even when no coercion is threatened” (Vachudova and Moravcsik, 2003). Furthermore, “a seat at the Council table gives small and medium-sized countries more say in world affairs through the EU’s collective weight. And it is also beneficial in disputes with their neighbours; while those members left outside have much less influence” (Heather Grabbe and Ulrich Sedelmeier, 2010).Thus, full membership in the European Union brings enormous economic, societal, and other benefits to the societies, states, and markets involved. The emulation of the Western European economic order and welfare state cuts across the political and societal spectrum, assuring guarantees for different segments of the society with divergent and conflicting political interests, while access to the potential of the common market provides for substantial gains and a slow convergence towards the living standards of the Western societies. Full membership also exponentially multiplies the “costs” of undemocratic regime change carried by a potential authoritarian elite, thus leading to the preservation of democratic political regimes in the member states. This does not mean that the member states will inevitably reach the highest levels of democratization and liberalization, nor does it mean that European integration creates some kind of “deus ex machina” leading towards “ever more democratic and liberal countries”. As Charles Tilly argues, “sunny optimism about the durability and inevitable advance of democratization seems utterly displaced” (Tilly, 2007), and in the case of the full member states of European Union, there has not been a clear “path dependency” leading towards full democratic consolidation. Recent evidence from the Central and Eastern European countries shows that some form of deconsolidation can take place over time, and media freedom and the independence of the regulatory bodies can be a challenge even for some of the founding member states. However, the conclusion that there has not been any case of full democratic breakdown in the European Union holds even after seventy years after the inception of the European Union and five major waves of enlargement (1973, 1981-1987, 1995, 2004, 2013-?), two of which comprised the incorporation of countries emerging from decades of authoritarian and totalitarian systems. The fifth wave began with the Croatian accession in 2013, but so far none of the other stabilization and association agreement countries (i.e. the WB6) have joined the European Union, so the wave is more of a ripple at the moment than a full enlargement wave.Western Balkans – when conditionality meets sovereignty and great power politicsThe former Yugoslav countries are a perfect example for the idea that nothing is predetermined in history and politics. Former Yugoslavia had a form of association with the European Economic Community since the early 1970s, and unlike other communist countries, the citizens of Yugoslavia had the freedom to travel both in Western and in Eastern Europe without any visa restrictions. In economic terms, former Yugoslavia had a thorough and deep cooperation with the Western European countries. The irony of history for the Western Balkan nations is that their Eastern border was the “Iron Curtain” until 1989, so for the citizens of the Warsaw Pact countries the “free world” began at the Yugoslav border. In a few months, this very same border may become a Schengen frontier for the citizens of the former Yugoslav countries (except for Slovenia and Croatia) and the entry point to the European Union. In a way, the fate of the post-Yugoslav countries (except for Slovenia) contradicts the findings of Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky, who argue that “Western leverage (governments’ vulnerability to external pressure) and linkage to the West (the density of a country’s ties to the United States, the European Union, and Western-led multilateral institutions)” explain the divergent paths of the post-communist countries (Way & Levitsky, 2005). The level of Western leverage and linkage to the former Yugoslavia was by far the greatest compared with any other post-communist country, using any statistic possible. Still, the country collapsed.In the early 1990s, it was popular to explain the collapse of former Yugoslavia, which was followed by bloody wars, as a resurgence of “ancient hatreds”, “primordial conflicts”, “tribal instincts”, “balkanization,” and other deprecating and pejorative expressions. However, the essence of the Yugoslav crisis was the inability of the federation to manage the “segmental institutions” of its constituent parts (Roeder, 2007).
In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the European Union began the Stabilization and Association Process (a modified version of the Association process, with an emphasis on stabilization in order to accentuate the post-conflict situation in the Western Balkans), with the objective of preparing the participant countries for full membership in the European Union. At the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, all of the EU’s member states declared their “unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries” and that “the future of the Balkans is within the European Union”. The Thessaloniki Declaration gave a concrete prospect of membership to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia (now succeeded by Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo).Two decades after the end of the violent conflicts, Croatia has been a member of the EU since 2013 and entered the eurozone and the Schengen area in 2023, Montenegro and Serbia have been negotiating for almost a decade, Albania will probably start the negotiation process in the coming period, the Macedonian European integration was stuck in the antiquity (through the Greek veto) and is now lost somewhere in the Middle Ages (through the Bulgarian veto), Bosnia and Herzegovina has finally become a candidate country (after Ukraine and Moldova), and Kosovo is expected to complete its visa liberalization process.Nonetheless, these recent developments in the region signal the limits of the democratic conditionality. Namely, one role of the European Union in the Western Balkans, as a foreign power seeking to exert its influence in order to pacify the region, meets another of its role, as a “Staatenverbund” (association of sovereign states) that the Western Balkan countries aspire to join as full members. Gergana Noutcheva observes that “in the Western Balkans, the question of whether the EU is genuinely concerned about spreading its norms, or is acting out of a rational interest to secure stability on the Continent, has been more prominent in the political thinking on the receiving end of EU conditionality, as a result of which compliance with conditions tied to sovereignty has been either fake or partial or imposed by external actors. When the EU's policy lacks strong normative foundations, political leaders in non-EU countries tend to reject EU-sponsored ideas about what is right and appropriate for the governance and external relations of their states and tend to revert to domestic sources of legitimacy, no matter whether these are based on rationality or identity” (Noutcheva, 2007).On the other hand, the countries of the region have recently shown that they can cope with very demanding, comprehensive, and wide-ranging reform, even in the most sensitive areas. The visa-liberalization process has ended with success in all six countries, even though it incurred considerable institutional and financial costs. The opening of the accession negotiations, with a clear timeframe for concluding the process, can lead to the same effects already witnessed in the ten post-communist countries that have already joined the EU.
In reality, the processes observed by Noutcheva (2007) and Sasse (2008) are part of the same phenomenon, with the major difference in their status vis-à-vis the European Union. The incorporation of the Balkan countries in the EU will prevent any backsliding into a full democratic breakdown, as witnessed in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.
ConclusionThis article analysed the role of the European Union in the democratization processes of former European authoritarian and totalitarian states, as well as the institutionalization of the EU’s role as a “democratizing agent”. The other external influences (the US security umbrella, NATO integration, and the role of political actors in shaping the diverse outcomes of transitions) were not taken into consideration, although they must be an integral part of any thorough analysis of the influence of external factors on emerging democracies. This article only focused on the European Union and has argued that the most important role of the EU in democratization is the role of democratic stabilization, which is only possible after a country’s full accession to the Union. This finding can be reinforced by the fact that the only emerging third-wave democracy left out of the third enlargement (Turkey) has experienced a military coup and a full democratic breakdown. The same political dynamic can also be observed in post-communist countries. It seems that democratic conditionality can exert the influence of the European Union and lead towards a change of the political elite in candidates and potential candidates (Slovakia 1998, Croatia 1999, Serbia 2000), but the structural deficiencies of the domestic political systems still remain. Furthermore, the countries left without any clear EU

Illicit Threats from non-State Actors in the BalkansPublished in 2022 by NATO Defense College Foundation

Rabi W. Sedrak

Western Balkans, in general, and North Macedonia, in particular, continue to face serious challenges from criminal networks engaged in the smuggling of drugs, persons, migrants, corruption, terrorism, and other related issues. North Macedonia is part of a region that represents the shortest passage between the Middle East, a region experiencing war and prolonged instabilities, and Europe, a destination that offers international protection. The stability and security of this corridor affect the safety of the entire European continent and then the security of all NATO member countries. Threats from non-state actors in the Balkans are interconnected and interdependent. Most of the crimes causing such instabilities are perpetrated by indigenous organized crime groups.Terrorists and organized crime groups (OCGs) have similar organizational structures and use almost same tactics to realize their goals. Their relationship has developed progressively in recent years. The coordination and cooperation between those two entities have increased their technical, financial, and operational capabilities, making it even harder for state institutions to fight against them.The cooperation between OCGs and terrorist groups may take many forms. For instance, OCGs facilitate the issuance of legitimate IDs and passports to terrorist groups, enabling their movement in and out of the region. Furthermore, through financing terrorist groups, OCGs benefit from their protection and the protection of their illegal activities inside and outside Europe.I want to mention a couple of examples involving North Macedonia. The first, where Police officers were arrested in Skopje as part of a criminal gang supplying passports and identity documents to internationally wanted criminals. Those Police officers have issued more than 200 passports to foreign nationals, including members of international crime groups and drug cartels.Thanks to international police cooperation, through US regional security office and Interpol, the true identity of the individuals who obtained the passportswith stolen identities was revealed. Those individuals are with high-risk profiles, involved in serious international crimes and wanted under international warrants. According to a report published by "the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime", one of the criminals is the head of the "Skaljari" gang, one of the biggest drug cartels in the Balkan region. He has been using a passport issued from North Macedonia because Montenegrin Police supplied information about him to other criminals.When international criminals succeed in issuing passports with a different identity in a legal way, they can travel, open bank accounts abroad, do money laundering, and represent serious obstruction for regional policies fighting against organized crime, like Interpol and the American "DEA". When the Ministry of Interior issues such passports with a stolen identity from someone else, this means that criminals were able to go to a police station, get photographed, submit biometric data, and much more.The second example I want to mention, it is about the illegal immigrants passing through the Balkan route. It is a smuggling ring that includes Police officers who were arrested earlier. They were involved in smuggling migrants for money and are responsible for the entry of thousands of migrants to Europe.Organized Crime Prosecution claims that this ring has smuggled migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Bangladesh, and Middle Eastern countries through North Macedonia and had been charging from 500 to 700 euros per person. They were using some illegal border crossings near the southern borders to smuggle illegal migrants from Greece, transporting them through the country, then transferring them illegally to Serbia in the north, a one step closer toward their final destination in the European countries.Throughout the years, OCGs in the Balkans have acquired very intimidating powers. Criminal organizations' capabilities and the threats posed to the democratic processes, including elections, arise from the exhaustive use of their resources, including large amounts of money to influence government officials at multiple levels. There is a strong correlation between the robust presence of OCGs and the weak judicial system, which lack both independence and integrity.According to Briscoe and Goff, established criminal organizations are likely to have long-standing relationships with certain political actors, especially in local contexts. When they set out to influence the electoral process, criminal organizations-as separate entities from networks of political corruption-are most likely to exert influence on election campaigns and during voting on election day. Furthermore, OCG tend to use the process to legitimate their activities or to extend their influence far beyond the crime.1 Catalina Uribe Burcher (editor), Ivan Briscoe, Diana Goff, Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Political Parties, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Clingendael Institute, (2016). https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/protecting-politics-deterring-influence-organized-crime-political-partiesReturning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (RFTF) experience in Europe and particularly in the Balkans was unique since the participation of adult fighters from the Balkans with ISIS was a voluntary-based involvement and not a recruitment-based one. Despite global interest in fighting violent extremism in the past two decades, only few efforts focused on the deradicalization process. However, the available reintegration programs are likely to be inadequate especially for individuals under 18 years old, since such programs were originally developed to address adult soldiers and not minors. RTFT in the Balkans and particularly in North Macedonia are currently going through compact DDRR programs (Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and rehabilitation) that last between 3 and 9 weeks, which is a relatively short period to guarantee success to the reintegration and the rehabilitation process.There were several cases where some radicals have left Europe legally and then, they returned in an illegal way to commit terrorist acts or other crimes in EU countries. The lack of evidence for their re-entry made it harder for law enforcement agencies to probe their involvement in those crimes. Besides, public prosecutors, especially in the Balkans, when they do not have enough evidence to prove the involvement of these individuals in such acts committed in the Middle East, are forced to give minimum sentences that can even be as little as three months imprisonment. Afterwards, and with ineffective DDRR programs, radicals return back to their societies and recruit more individuals. They may get also involved again in such crimes if they have a low income or due to social insecurity.It is very important to study the interaction between organized crime and politics, to define points of interaction and work towards handling them, considering that OCGs in the Balkans, on the opposite of their counterparts in other countries, tend to have a huge interest in daily politics.We have concluded that the fight against organized crime, especially in North Macedonia has two components or let's say it is based on two pillars. The first is understanding and analyzing the nature of the phenomena to develop a concrete methodology in the right context and the second is the commitment and the determination of state institutions to the fight against organized crime. North Macedonia is facing many challenges, among which we can point three main issues:Unwillingness of personnel involved with OCGs to quit, due to social insecurity, low salaries or other.
Involvement of state officials or other political structures in OCG activities.
Insufficient cooperation between local and international institutions dealing with the issue.
Balkan countries undertook radical reforms to fight organized crime, including reforming state institutions and improving the cooperation between national and international institutions in every state. However, preventing transnational organized crime requires more effective collaboration between all countries in the Balkans since it is a joint responsibility and not just the responsibility of one country only. Neighbouring states may coordinate successful joint anti-corruption campaigns and strengthen the role of internal affairs within the different political parties in the region. Communication is the key, since fighting OCGs depends much on the quality of networking, communication and information exchange between state institutions and their counterparts in neighbouring countries, in compliance with all previously signed treaties and conventions.Taking into account the repressive approach used in the Balkans to such phenomena and what we have learned from the Middle East experience, maybe it is time to use a more preventive approach that limit the creation of OCGs, stop their expansion and cut their transnational ties.

Morality & Economic Development

Dr. Kiril Minoski

One of the many definitions of morality describes it as a social phenomenon determined by a set of rules and norms, practices, identities, and institutions that regulate the behavior of members of a society. However, morality also shapes habits and behavioral patterns. Through moral norms, personal interests are suppressed to create conditions for societal development based on the principles of cooperation and solidarity.As a result of social interaction, moral norms influence the formation of an individual’s personality and character within society, guide their motivation for action, and affect how they perceive themselves and others.
The fundamental characteristic of moral norms is their obligatory nature, both for society as a whole and for the individual. Thus, dominant moral norms impact the entire society.Since economics as a science studies the use of resources to meet human needs, and the human factor is one of the main resources and drivers of economic development, numerous theories examine the relationship between economic growth and moral values.As a result of these studies, a distinct scientific discipline called "moral economy" has emerged, which analyzes not only the material but also the moral dimension of economic activities.In his book Moral Economy, published in 1998, John P. Paulson wrote:"In a moral economy, with today’s technology, no one should be poor... The moral economy ensures that the benefits of technology are used, cares for ecology, eliminates ethnic and gender bias, and reduces the unequal distribution of wealth... In a moral economy, governments act as facilitators of processes rather than imposing authority. A moral economy implies a balance between interventionism and libertarianism, between economic factors and ethical norms in the name of social justice."According to Paulson, moral economy and economic prosperity reinforce each other. Although capital accumulation and market development are key determinants of a nation's economic prosperity, there is a clear proportional relationship between moral norms, a well-established value system, and national prosperity.The Protestant work ethic is at the core of the prosperity of liberal economies and effective institutions in Western Anglo-Saxon countries. Similar examples can be found in the Asian economies of Japan, China, and Singapore, where, alongside other factors, moral norms and societal value systems have directly influenced economic development and the creation of prosperous economies.How to Build a Moral Economy Based on High Ethical and Moral Standards?Building individual morality and an ethical code is the foundation of a moral economy. This applies especially to policymakers, institutional leaders, and those managing social processes. The decades of "social and economic transition" in which the former system was abandoned promoted values such as deceit, the appropriation of state property, misuse of public resources, and corruption as criteria for capital accumulation.
These processes were managed precisely by those who once propagated and defended the Marxist vision of social organization, self-managed socialism, and equality for all. In a short period, social capital with an accounting value of $11 billion (with a significantly higher market value) was privatized for a modest sum of just over a hundred million euros. This led to the creation of an oligarchy closely tied to the nomenclature of the former system.For the Macedonian state and economy, this represented the original sin that, in less than a year, created 350,000 social cases, caused lasting distortions in social relations, destroyed the middle class—society’s and the economy’s main driver—and promoted plunder, negative selection, and sycophancy as supreme social values. This marked the beginning of the decline of society, the economy, institutions, healthcare, and education.Today, we witness the consequences: during the pandemic, Macedonia had the highest mortality rate in Europe; its universities are ranked 1944th on the Shanghai list; institutions are dysfunctional and corrupt; and hundreds of thousands of citizens have emigrated as economic migrants, unwilling to be exploited for minimum wages.The former "comrades" overnight became the most ruthless exploiters—blackmailing employees with job loss to amass majority shares in newly transformed joint-stock companies, most of which later failed. These were the same figures who, just a few years earlier, had been appointed as directors through the system of Workers' Councils.Simultaneously, a judicial and prosecutorial system of loyalists was created to legitimize and protect what had been appropriated. This system of servility, sycophancy, and negative selection became the dominant path to "success in the social hierarchy"—and remains so to this day.With such a distorted moral value system, its eventual collapse was only a matter of time. It is no surprise that Macedonia is perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, with minimal trust in institutions, weak economic performance, a low standard of living, widespread corruption and crime, general apathy, and mass youth emigration.The agitprop messages and virtual reality narratives from those in power, boasting of "successful economic policies" and "historically high minimum wages," cannot obscure the facts: a record-high public debt of 61%, projected to rise to 65% within two years, an unprecedented pace of borrowing, declining living standards, and empty store shelves reminiscent of the 1980s just before the collapse of the former state, when a coupon system was introduced.The reality we live in today only confirms the theoretical concepts of moral economy, demonstrating that resetting the value system and building a society based on morality is the only path to social and economic development.Otherwise, the ongoing social and economic decline will continue. Anything that is fundamentally flawed cannot yield good results. However, periods of great turmoil can also present opportunities for a fresh start—provided we choose to act in accordance with genuine moral values, founded on the principles of social cooperation and solidarity.

EU Accession and the Myth of Anti-corruption Progress

Rabi W. Sedrak

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Cubs of the Caliphate - Challenges vs ThreatsPublished in 2021 by NATO Defense College Foundation

Rabi W. Sedrak

NATO Defense College Foundation PaperThe Cubs of the Caliphate are the children who were exploited by ISIS during the armed conflicts in its quasi-state within Iraq and Syria. Created to serve one purpose, to ensure the continuity of the Caliphate and to convey ISIS ideology and message to future generations all over the world. Even though the Islamic State was militarily defeated, the number of children indoctrinated by the Islamic State’s ideology is still increasing, and if not treated properly, those children will definitely represent a threat to European security.Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (RFTF) experience in Europe and particularly in Balkans is very unique since the involvement of adult fighters with ISIS was a voluntary-based involvement and not a recruitment-based one. Despite the global interest in fighting violent extremism in the past two decades, only few efforts focused on the deradicalization process itself. Ultimately, the available reintegration programmes are likely to be inadequate for those children since they were originally developed to address adult soldiers and not minors.This article defines the Cubs of the Caliphate, their role, their purpose, and their long-term impact on European security. As well, it presents the three possible scenarios awaiting RFTF and their family members and provides recommendations based on the analysis of different case studies from the Middle East.A Perpetual ImpactA research published by ICPVTR¹, indicates that ISIS has a multigenerational vision when it comes to recruiting and indoctrinating children and the consequences of such vision will probably develop a multigeneration impact. The legacy of war and its psychological aftermath will continue to shape the lives of children who were recruited by the Islamic State for a very long time.This means that children who have participated in violence during armed conflict tend to suffer from psychological illnesses, while their continuous exposure to violence could possibly lead to the steady incorporation of violence as a criterion - when the exception becomes a rule.¹Sara, Mohamed. 2016. “Cubs of the Caliphate: The Islamic State Focus on Children”, International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research - Children Recruitment Impact.When ISIS was defeated and amidst their withdrawal, thousands of children were left behind. Those children who were exposed to wars and armed conflicts, and were indoctrinated with such extreme ideologies (once disarmed, and demobilized), will definitely become a challenge to peace and security. The integrated radical thoughts and extreme beliefs in those children’s brain are heavily rooted. Such doctrine was developed specifically to be conveyed to their entire generation and consequently to the entire region.The Iraqi government announced recently, that there are more than 1,000 foreign children of ISIS-affiliated parents on its territory, where most of them are held inside detention centres and were left without their families in Iraq after the defeat of the organization in 2017. Between the harsh living conditions and an uncertain future, Islamic State children remain as the organization’s most affected victims by its terrorism in Iraq and Syria over the past 7 years.According to ICPVTR, the participation of children in Islamic State provokes a recurring pattern of violence that is likely to persist at three levels:Children involved in violence are likely to fall back into the same.
Children will continue to represent and fight for Islamic State due to ISIS systemic indoctrination.
The present generation of children will act as a catalyst for the mobilization and recruitment of subsequent generations.
To attain a successful reintegration and rehabilitation process, relevant institutions should focus on developing tailor-made DDRR² programmes (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and rehabilitation). It is true that the participation of children in violent actions violates conventional war conduct; however, child soldiers always remain neglected during the post-conflict restructuration stage after cessation of hostilities.In a nutshell, physical, psychological, and social needs of children who were indoctrinated by the Islamic State or by similar ideologies, must be an essential part of any DDRR program or similar reintegration programmes. Providing educational training for children who have missed proper schooling while being a part of the Islamic State, will definitely establish social and economic alternatives to being a member of a terrorist organization.²Benotman, Noman & Malik, Nikita. 2016. “The Children of Islamic State,” Quilliam Foundation.Three Possible ScenariosBetween the walls of correction facilities and the remaining refugee’s camps in Iraq and Syria, thousands of orphan ISIS children, whose parents have died in combat or fled to other countries, are awaiting an unknown fate. And amid tight security, they are being transported across the borders of Syria and Iraq back to their countries of origin. The return of those cubs to their home countries is still a big challenge facing the international community especially EU and Balkan countries, since most of them are still minors, under 18 years of age.The return of those children back to EU and Balkan countries, did not end the crisis. On the opposite, their return created a new challenge yet to be faced by those countries’ governments, i.e. achieving a psychological balance through rehabilitation for these prisoners. We are not here today to address or discuss statistics and number, but to face the fact that quite a large number of such indoctrinated children are actually living among us in Europe, regardless of whether they took part of some armed conflicts abroad or not. EU and Balkan countries, have the full responsibility to take serious steps towards rehabilitating those children, otherwise the question remains, what will be the fate of those children in Europe if no action is taken?Here we are looking at three possible scenarios: Reintegration, Imprisonment and Taking no action.Rehabilitation and ReintegrationThe first scenario is to reintegrate those children back into their societies. However, this step must be preceded by a phase of psychological, educational, and societal rehabilitation; considering that those children used to live in very exceptional circumstances throughout wars and beyond.Considering the challenges facing the reintegration scenario, we need to point out that the rehabilitation phase, to achieve a psychological balance for those children and reintegrate them back into their local communities requires a very long time maybe even years, since the purpose here is to get rid of all the negative effects and potential extremist ideas that were established in the minds of those young people.Rehabilitation per se is not an impossible task, but rather requires very specific and dedicated treatment programmes, adequate budgets, and special facilities, in addition to specialists in psychiatry and social care, time, and huge effort related to the cooperation and the orchestration betweenrelevant institutions involved in the process. We have to note that the state capability to confront the ideology of terrorist organizations - resources and its ability to keep up and stay updated - and time, are the two major elements to save the children of the Islamic State.Few European countries, as well Canada and Australia have succeeded in absorbing those children upon their return, taking important steps towards a psychological, health and social rehabilitation, reintegration courses, and dialogue sessions between specialists and victims of such terrorist organization. Such practices emphasize the significance of a serious and a thoughtful interaction with those children.ImprisonmentField reports indicate that the majority of Islamic State children are coming from Eastern European countries as well from Germany and Turkey. The Central Criminal Court in Baghdad is one of the main institutions that is responsible for deporting those children back to their countries of origin. Some of those countries have rejected the responsibility to receive them, while other countries have agreed and started the procedures for their return and for their rehabilitation process.Regarding imprisonment, we are all aware that a prison would not be the most adequate place for ISIS children, and it is far from being a practical solution to reduce their future potential risk. Such scenario of “throwing them in the hole” will probably result in an opposite outcome: it will rather facilitate for those children to become preys to the same terrorist organizations or to extreme individuals currently in prison or worse to organised crime.On the legislative side, relevant institutions must understand that tightening laws against ISIS children and punishing them with imprisonment can only cause irreversible damages. Given the fact that children at such a young age, need a rebuilding for their mind and perception, as well as to erase the negative influence of the ISIS phase, the post-ISIS phase, and the loss of their families; rather than punishing them for something they did not do, or maybe for something they did under coercion or while they were not really aware of.Taking No ActionThe most alarming action that EU countries and the international community can take, is to leave ISIS children without any rehabilitation or reintegration process. Unfortunately, this is the scenario I am expecting for those children upon returning to their home countries, and this is exactly what the Islamic State is expecting us to do and even wishing for it. Such approach will only facilitate the reproduction of new extremists who believe only in violence and in taking up arms and fighting against the members of their own communities.Many experiences in the past have underestimated the return of Islamic State children and their families, which led to the creation of new generations of extremists that until today the world is suffering from their actions. One of those experiences was the return of the first generations of Al-Qaeda fighters to their home countries, which resulted in the emergence of Bin-Laden who became later the leader of the same organization, such families like Bin-Laden’s, were left without rehabilitation which made it easy for extremist ideologies to spread down the line through younger generations.ConclusionIslamic State children do not know what a normal life is, they grew up in a different society and they have been through extreme physical and psychological sufferings. The reintegration of those children will be a very hard task to achieve. One of the factors that will determine the proper methodology for the reintegration of those children is to study whether they have chosen willingly to join the Islamic State, or they were forced by their parents to join - “victims vs radicals”. In other words, to learn whether if the ISIS brainwash process already took place and to which extent, or they were just at the wrong time in the wrong place.In order to answer such question, an inclusive analysis should be made to determine the nature of their involvement with such terrorist groups as well their tendency to join similar groups in the future after being reintegrated! Relevant institutions involved in this process, must focus on the environment surrounding those children, such as school, friends, and the society as a whole. Engaging their surrounding environment in the reintegration process, will play a major role in theprevention of radicalization of those children by raising the public awareness, facing, and talking about the problem rather than running away from it.Different study cases indicate that the reintegration approach must be on a case-to-case basis, and the rehabilitation and reintegration process must be designed and tailor-made according to every individual and/or group of individuals; regardless of whether those children will be submitted to court proceedings or not before going through such programmes.Our experience in Europe is different, since the involvement of the adult fighters with those terrorist groups was on a voluntary basis and not on a recruitment one. Thus, reintegrating their children will be a hard task, and finding them will be even harder. There are thousands of children that are being held in those detention facilities, and with the lack of resources and proper reintegration methods and approaches, those children will risk being left without rehabilitation and as I mentioned earlier, that’s the last scenario we wish to have.At this point, I would like to raise a question: Let’s imagine a group of children, who are being held together at the same detention facility in Iraq or Syria, coming from similar cultures or backgrounds, and speaking the same or similar language; regardless of whether if they will go through a rehabilitation process or not! How would they feel towards their countries of origin, if those countries lack them behind and throw the key? Frustrated maybe? Developing a need to revenge? Or developing a need to punish those countries or the citizens of those countries?RecommendationFrom this standpoint, relevant institutions in Europe and particularly in Balkans, must treat the Cubs of the Caliphate as a special case and with the assistance of specialized NGOs and civic organizations, to develop dedicated tailor-made programmes to the rehabilitation and reintegration of those children.Case studies in the Middle East³, indicated that traditional DDR programmes are likely to be inadequate for children. If we take children who have been indoctrinated by extreme religious or political beliefs, and apply such programmes on them, we will notice that traditional programmes focus on immediate physical health needs but are too short to address the psychosocial aspect, not³Benotman, Noman & Malik, Nikita. 2016. “The Children of Islamic State,” Quilliam Foundation.to mention the deradicalization component. Such programmes were originally developed to rehabilitate adult soldiers and not children.Despite the global interest in fighting violent extremism in the past two decades, only few efforts focused on the deradicalization process itself. Understanding how terrorist recruiters exploit children’s vulnerabilities is a very important factor in the development of effective deradicalization programmes that can guarantee a safe and successful rehabilitation process. Prevention, raising public awareness, information exchange and transfer of know-how are the key in fighting terrorism and violence and the only path towards a successful reintegration.

One Intelligence Community – Brief Analysis

Rabi W. Sedrak

A

Why Is History Necessary?
The Significance of History in Times of Global Change

Prof. Dalibor Jovanovski

In academic discussion, there are many viewpoints on the importance of history in shaping international relations, state development, institution-building, community formation, national identity, urban development, family structures, medical advancements, and beyond. Nevertheless, it is crucial to avoid the deterministic assertion that without history - often referred to by historians as magistra vitae (the teacher of life) - the prediction of events and processes would be impossible. Historical research provides valuable insights through careful interpretation, but it is not a crystal ball for the future.These diverse viewpoints stand in sharp contrast to Francis Fukuyama’s thesis in The End of History, a work that, while initially celebrated, has since faced widespread criticism. Today, it's often cited as a striking example of an intellectual misjudgment, with some even calling it one of the most significant errors in recent political thought. Looking back, Fukuyama’s argument can be seen as a reflection of how scholarship can become entangled with the political mood of a particular moment. This serves as a reminder of how important it is for scholars and analysts to approach their interpretations with care and critical distance, no matter how persuasive or timely an idea might seem.Fukuyama’s work significantly influenced the development of certain intellectual currents, particularly among politicians and scholars aligned with neoliberal ideology, fostering the belief that society should focus on the future rather than the past. The underlying premise was straightforward: history was of limited relevance. This perspective, much like the rhetoric extolling the virtues of visionary leaders who claim to look exclusively forward, was initially appealing. In the early years of the emerging rules-based global order - an order whose precise contours remained largely undefined - such notions may have seemed compelling. However, they ultimately proved erroneous and, in certain contexts, such as the Macedonian case, even disastrous.Contrary to the predictions of historical finality, the subsequent period witnessed the expansion of historical inquiry rather than its cessation. New academic disciplines emerged, including Global History and the so-called Big History, paradoxically supported by the same institutional and ideological structures that had previously advocated for a forward-looking perspective at the expense of historical awareness. These disciplines have made valuable contributions to historical scholarship, reaffirming the principle that scientific inquiry is an ongoing and evolving process. Indeed, history itself is never definitively written, despite the oft-cited adage that it is authored by the victors, an assertion that, while potentially valid in authoritarian societies, remains subject to critical scrutiny.In the present moment of profound global transformation, to assert that history has “returned” or been “revived” would be to replicate the same conceptual misstep as those who once proclaimed its end.But is history truly important and necessary? Here are a few reflections on the matter.According to American Historical Association, history inform our understanding of everything and historians’ voices are essential in the conversation about current events.At the site of Institute for historical research we could read that history matters within public life. It matters within personal life. And it matters in all the spaces in between. History helps us to understand our world today and to know that things were not always thus. History can strengthen understanding within complex and diverse contemporary societies. History helps us to plan our future.Two years ago, the World Economic Forum’s website featured a compelling analysis on the significance of history. The impetus for this analysis arose from the increasingly limited historical knowledge among young Americans. The report highlighted the following observations: “a loss of grounding in history and the humanities can be dangerous anywhere…That may be especially true a period of geopolitical friction and flourishing artificial intelligence”.At a moment when a new global order is emerging, one whose specific form remains uncertain, except for its anticipated multipolarity, historical knowledge becomes not only useful but imperative. However, one must exercise caution and refrain from hastily drawing conclusions. The history of humanity is replete with transformations in political systems, territorial boundaries, population movements, and global or regional orders, some characterized by the dominance of multiple powers, while others, such as the most recent world order, have been defined by U.S. hegemony. Nevertheless, those who have employed historical analysis in their assessments have long recognized that even this order would eventually give way to a new one. The key questions were always when and how such a shift would occur. Historically, changes in global orders are often linked to significant economic and political crises.The contemporary shift began with the economic crisis of 2008, which marked the gradual decline of Western hegemony. A similar pattern unfolded during the Great Depression of the 1920s, a period that signaled the advent of a new era in which authoritarian regimes briefly emerged, culminating in the most devastating conflict in human history - World War II. The war’s conclusion, in turn, established a new global order in which Europe was divided into a Western democratic bloc and an Eastern communist and authoritarian one.
Today, the rising influence of both radical right and left movements in Europe raises profound questions regarding the underlying causes and dynamics of these shifts. Meanwhile, the European elites, entrenched in their lack of innovation, continue to persist in outdated approaches to these emerging geopolitical challenges. The attempt to counter opposition with authoritarian methods, allegedly in the name of protecting democracy, fundamentally misconstrues the essence of democratic defense. Democracy is not safeguarded by prohibiting participation in presidential or parliamentary elections, but through innovation and intellectual renewal. Nevertheless, the answer to the question of why and how these political parties emerged lies, among other factors, in historical context, not as the exclusive explanation, but as a significant contributing factor. A thorough analysis of the economic and political history of Europe, and indeed the world, prior to the rise of fascism and Nazism, provides essential insight into this phenomenon. The response to this question is rooted in the broader historical trajectory, where the failure and ideological exhaustion of ruling parties have consistently paved the way for more radical ideologies, which often resonate more strongly with the general populace.Today, we are witnessing the rise of a new major global power, both economically and militarily, and potentially politically in the future - the People's Republic of China. China has skillfully leveraged the benefits of globalization to become a developed and powerful force, increasingly attractive to others, especially those dissatisfied with the existing rules-based international order. However, it is often overlooked that, until the late 18th century, China (then an empire) was also a dominant power, albeit disinterested in extending its influence beyond its immediate periphery. This, however, has changed. We are now confronted with a growing body of analyses, studies, and books exploring China’s interest in maritime trade routes, and potentially their control, as well as the intensifying discourse surrounding the reassertion of state control over production and economic planning. An insightful contribution to this debate is Arnaud Orain’s Le monde confisque. Essai sur le capitalisme de la finitude (XVIe – XXIe siècle) (Flarmmon, 2025). In historical terms, China is following the path once tread by the early European global empires (Portugal and Spain) later mirrored by Great Britain and the United States. The answers to these contemporary developments can, in part, be found by reflecting on historical precedents. The increasingly evident rapprochement between China and Russia has undeniably triggered alarm in the West, accompanied by extensive propaganda and a renewed binary division of the world into a so-called democratic and authoritarian camp. However, where does history factor into this? One critical perspective is provided by one of the most accomplished diplomats, scholars, and intellectuals of the modern era: the recently deceased Henry Kissinger. Regardless of whether one agrees with his views or critiques them sharply, his works remain an invaluable source for understanding the trajectory of international relations. Up until the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Kissinger persistently warned of the potential for a Russo-Chinese alignment, advising the West to seek to bring Russia into its fold. While his counsel was not heeded by all, it is clear that Kissinger’s stance was informed by his profound knowledge of the history of international relations and, notably, his success in navigating the alignment of the People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong against the former Soviet Union. Ultimately, the failure to acknowledge these historical lessons, whether through ignorance, a reluctance to engage with them, or a deliberate avoidance of useful insights, has had far-reaching consequences. Such misunderstandings lead to flawed decisions and misinformed conclusions, which is why Peter Burke’s exceptional work, Ignorance: A Global History (Yale University Press, 2023), is worth reading.In the literature, articles, and analyses we encounter, there is frequent reference to traditional friendships, alliances, and enduring partnerships. But is this truly the case? History, in fact, suggests otherwise. Ultimately, everything revolves around interest, not only in international relations but also in economics and domestic affairs. Lord Palmerston’s words from 1848 are often overlooked: “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it is our duty to follow” (Speech on the Polish Question in the House of Commons, 1848). This emphasizes that in politics, as well as in many other fields, the driving force is, in fact, the pursuit of national and strategic interests. This insight is particularly instructive in light of the current global transformations.The request by Donald Trump, the newly elected U.S. president, for Greenland to be ceded to the United States sparked a significant diplomatic controversy between Washington on one side and Copenhagen and Brussels on the other. This is not the first instance in the history of American-Danish relations where the idea of ceding Danish territory has been discussed. In fact, there is a historical precedent for the United States purchasing Danish territory. In 1917, Denmark sold the Virgin Islands (its only Caribbean colony) to the United States. Unlike the current situation, Copenhagen voluntarily relinquished its colony at the time, driven by economic and social considerations. However, there is a parallel with the present scenario. The United States acquired the islands for strategic reasons - to prevent the potential presence of German submarines in the Caribbean, which could have posed a direct threat to American interests. In the current context, Washington seeks Greenland for reasons of national security, particularly due to the growing competition for dominance over the Arctic region. While historical analogies can often be a useful analytical tool, they are also fraught with risks, as they can sometimes lead to misleading or erroneous conclusions. Nevertheless, such comparisons are both insightful and necessary. Some may argue that Denmark is a longstanding ally of the United States, and this is undoubtedly true. However, if the U.S. views this issue as one of national security, Palmerston’s statement from 1848 remains relevant. This underlines that in matters of politics, particularly regarding strategic interests, alliances and adversities are fluid. The danger of relying too heavily on historical analogies lies in their potential to obscure rather than clarify contemporary realities.The reason for mentioning this is to highlight a specific instance: following Russia's unjust invasion of Ukraine, then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson remarked that Russia would experience a fate similar to that of the Crimean War, in which it was defeated by the British, French, and Ottoman coalition. While it is true that history offers many lessons, Johnson's historical analogy overlooked a critical factor. Every war occurs within its own specific historical context, and he failed to draw a comparative analysis of the power dynamics between Britain and France during the Crimean War and the present-day Russian Federation, whose military and geopolitical influence are far stronger than that of Imperial Russia in the 19th century. This oversight significantly undermines the premise of his argument. However, such historical misjudgments are often shaped by political agendas and fall within the realm of propaganda It is noteworthy that Russia's invasion of an independent Ukraine has brought to the surface the propaganda campaigns of both sides - the Russian and the Ukrainian, supported by their Western allies. This has led to unprecedented vilification of both parties, media bans, and the dissemination of such narratives across numerous countries. Some have supported these perspectives, while others have critiqued them. Many have regarded this as something entirely novel in the context of military conflict and political discourse, but is this truly the case? To gain a deeper understanding of this issue, one need only examine the history of pre-war and wartime propaganda used by belligerent parties in more recent conflicts. Such an exploration quickly clarifies many aspects of the current situation. Looking ahead, we can expect that similar forms of propaganda will continue to influence public opinion, shaping individuals' views and perspectives in the future.History is indispensable in the analysis of nearly all fields, including even personal life, as unlikely as that may sound. However, like any other discipline, history has gradually become a multidisciplinary science. Consequently, when analyzing the present and future, history must be integrated with sociology, psychology, and even the technical sciences. Naturally, we must not fall into the assumption that history alone provides the answers to contemporary events, global shifts, or projections for the future. While history is essential as a tool to inform these analyses, the misconception of the "end of history" must not evolve into the belief that history alone offers solutions to all questions.

[STRATEGY] CONNECTING FOUR SEAS AND A GREAT RIVER: MACEDONIA - A SECURE, ECONOMIC, AND SUSTAINABLE REGIONAL HUB

Institute for International Strategic & Security Studies

I. Introduction: Macedonia’s Strategic OpportunityMacedonia’s unique position at the nexus of Southeastern Europe—bridging the Adriatic, Aegean, Ionian, and Black Seas, and intersecting with the Danube River—offers an unparalleled opportunity to redefine its role in the 21st century. Historically, this crossroads facilitated the Roman Via Egnatia and Ottoman trade networks, shaping regional economies and empires. Today, as a NATO member and EU candidate, Macedonia is poised to transform from a landlocked, infrastructure-challenged state into a secure, economically dynamic, and sustainable regional hub. This strategy outlines a comprehensive framework to achieve this vision by modernizing transport corridors, integrating security measures, leveraging fiscal innovation, and fostering diplomatic engagement. By aligning with global trends—such as the EU’s Green Deal, NATO’s strategic priorities, and strategic partnerships like the £5 billion (€6 billion) Macedonia-UK agreement signed in May 2025—Macedonia can drive prosperity, enhance regional stability, and strengthen its national identity.II. Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Context: A Shifting LandscapeA. Historical Foundations
Macedonia’s geostrategic significance is rooted in its history as a connectivity hub. The Via Egnatia (3rd century BCE) linked Dyrrhachium (modern Durres) to Byzantium, while the Via Axia connected the Danube to the Aegean, enabling trade and military campaigns. In the 19th century, great powers—Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Britain—vied for influence, shaping borders through treaties like Berlin (1878) and Bucharest (1913). These dynamics echo today, with modern powers (EU, NATO, China, Russia, and the UK) competing for regional influence. Macedonia must navigate this landscape to secure funding and partnerships, such as the Macedonia-UK strategic partnership, without compromising sovereignty.B. Contemporary Trends
Recent geopolitical and geoeconomic trends underscore the urgency of connectivity. The EU’s Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) aims to integrate Western Balkan infrastructure by 2030, with €30 billion allocated for regional projects. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has invested $19 billion in Balkan infrastructure since 2013, including Serbia’s Belgrade–Budapest railway. The Macedonia-UK partnership, providing up to £5 billion (€6 billion) in favorable loans through UK Export Finance, targets infrastructure, healthcare, education, and energy, aligning with TEN-T goals. NATO’s 2024 Strategic Concept emphasizes resilient logistics to counter hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks and smuggling. Regional initiatives, like the Adriatic–Ionian Strategy and the Berlin Process, prioritize cross-border connectivity, offering Macedonia funding and expertise. However, challenges persist: Greece’s Egnatia Odos (€8 billion, 670 km) dominates trade, Serbia’s Chinese-backed rail upgrades outpace regional competitors, and Bulgaria’s gas corridors marginalize Macedonia’s outdated infrastructure.C. Socioeconomic Imperatives
Macedonia’s rural regions, such as Pelagonia and Polog, face unemployment rates above 20%, exacerbating social tensions and outmigration (110,000 citizens emigrated between 2010–2023). The country’s GDP per capita (€6,200 in 2024) lags behind the EU average (€38,000), with 60% of exports reliant on congested Corridors 8 and 10. Weak infrastructure fuels organized crime, including drug trafficking (€1.2 billion annually, Europol 2024) and human smuggling, undermining security. Connectivity to four seas and the Danube, bolstered by the Macedonia-UK partnership’s infrastructure investments, offers a path to economic diversification, job creation, and stability.III. The Connectivity and Security Deficit: A Post-Independence ChallengeSince independence in 1991, Macedonia has struggled to capitalize on its geostrategic potential. The 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement resolved ethnic conflicts but diverted resources from infrastructure. The name dispute with Greece, resolved in 2018, delayed EU and NATO integration, deterring foreign direct investment (FDI). Unlike Greece’s modernized Egnatia Odos or Serbia’s $3.2 billion rail upgrades, Macedonia’s Corridors 8 and 10 remain incomplete. The missing Kičevo–Albania rail link (€600 million estimated cost) and outdated Corridor 10 infrastructure increase freight transit times by 40%, raising costs for exporters. This deficit has profound implications:
• Economic: Limited connectivity stifles trade, with exports to the EU (€4.8 billion in 2024) constrained by logistics bottlenecks.
• Security: Weak infrastructure enables illicit networks, with 70% of Balkan drug trafficking routes passing through Macedonia (UNODC 2024).
• Diplomatic: Overreliance on Thessaloniki’s port and single corridors increases vulnerability to geopolitical disruptions, such as Serbia–Kosovo tensions or Bulgaria’s border policies.
The Macedonia-UK partnership addresses these gaps by funding a fast railroad along Corridor 10 and other infrastructure projects, potentially generating €120 million in annual transit revenues.IV. Lessons from Balkan Diplomacy: Balancing Great Power InfluenceHistorically, Macedonia’s fate was shaped by great power rivalries. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin prioritized external interests, fragmenting the region. Today, Macedonia must navigate a multipolar landscape. The EU offers TEN-T funding but demands regulatory alignment. China’s BRI provides infrastructure loans but raises debt concerns (Serbia’s $7 billion BRI debt by 2024). The UK, through its £5 billion partnership, offers favorable loans and expertise without the geopolitical strings attached to Chinese investments, aligning with NATO and EU priorities. Russia’s influence, though diminished, persists through energy ties. Macedonia can draw on historical strategies—balancing external powers while asserting autonomy—by prioritizing EU, NATO, and UK partnerships, engaging cautiously with China, and fostering regional cooperation through the Berlin Process.V. Strategic Transport Pathways: A Four Seas and River NetworkModernizing historical pathways is central to this strategy. The following corridors align with EU TEN-T priorities, leverage historical precedents, and integrate security measures, with significant support from the Macedonia-UK partnership.A. Reviving the Via Egnatia Corridor
The historical Via Egnatia linked Ohrid, Bitola, and Prespa to Thessaloniki, serving as a Mediterranean trade artery. A modernized highway from Ohrid to Bitola, Prespa, and the Greek border (linking to Igoumenitsa), funded partly by the Macedonia-UK partnership’s €2.2 billion initial investment cycle, would restore this corridor. Upgrading rail lines from Bitola to Greece’s Egnatia Odos would reduce transit times by 30% and attract €800 million in logistics FDI by 2030 (World Bank estimate). Security measures, including AI-driven CCTV and border surveillance, would curb smuggling, aligning with Europol’s 2024 Balkan security framework.B. Corridors 8 and 10: Pan-Balkan Arteries
• Corridor 8 (East–West): Linking Durres (Adriatic) to Varna (Black Sea) via Skopje and Sofia, Corridor 8 is critical for regional trade. Completing the Kičevo–Albania rail link (€600 million), supported by UK Export Finance loans, and modernizing Skopje–Sofia segments would cut freight costs by 35%, boosting trade with Bulgaria (€1.1 billion in 2024). Security checkpoints with biometric screening would deter non-state threats.
• Corridor 10 (North–South): Connecting Gevgelija to Serbia via Skopje, Corridor 10 intersects Corridor 8, creating a logistics hub. High-speed rail (HSR) from Gevgelija to Tabanovce, integrated with Serbia’s $2 billion HSR and funded by the Macedonia-UK partnership, could reduce Skopje–Belgrade travel times from 5 hours to 2 hours, enhancing NATO-aligned connectivity.C. Secondary and Complementary Routes
• Skopje–Kosovo–Albania Spur: A highway and rail link from Skopje to Mitrovica, Peja, and Montenegro’s port of Bar, partially funded by the UK partnership, would diversify Adriatic access, reducing Thessaloniki dependence by 25%. This spur supports Kosovo’s integration and aligns with the EU’s 2024 Western Balkans Investment Framework.
• Skopje–Štip–Strumica–Bulgaria: Upgrading this route would streamline exports to Bulgaria’s Burgas and Varna ports, cutting transit times by 22% and boosting agricultural exports (€600 million in 2024).
• Skopje–Veles–Prilep Axis via Babuna: High-capacity roads through Babuna mountain would connect central Macedonia to Corridor 10, reducing rural unemployment by 15% through logistics jobs.
• Kičevo–Demir Hisar–Bitola: This southern highway, supported by UK funding, would link Corridor 8 to Greece’s Ionian corridor, supporting tourism and diversifying port access.
• Skopje–Debar–Tirana: Albania finishes the highway from Tirana to Debar. Expanding the road from Gostivar to Mavrovo and Debar, with UK-backed loans, would add another connection point to Albania and Corridor 8.VI. Fiscal Strategies for Sustainable FundingFunding a €4–5 billion infrastructure network requires innovative fiscal policies. The Macedonia-UK partnership provides €6 billion in favorable loans, with €2.2 billion allocated for the first five years and repayments deferred until 2027, reducing fiscal pressure. Macedonia’s 10% flat tax rate, one of Europe’s lowest, can attract FDI. Tax incentives for logistics and green technology firms, modeled on agricultural subsidies that attracted €200 million in 2018–2022, could draw €1 billion in FDI by 2030. EU TEN-T grants (covering 85% of costs), UK Export Finance loans, and public-private partnerships (PPPs) would offset costs. Regional bonds, backed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), would ensure financial stability, as seen in Croatia’s €1.5 billion Pelješac Bridge project. Transparent public finance management, leveraging Macedonia’s experience with EU-funded rail projects, would enhance investor confidence. However, concerns about increased public debt (potentially €400 million annually from the UK loans) necessitate careful fiscal oversight to avoid over-leveraging.VII. Security Implications: OCG & Hybrid ThreatsWeak infrastructure fuels organized crime and hybrid threats. Drug trafficking through the Vardar Valley (€1.2 billion annually) and human smuggling along Corridor 8 exploit connectivity gaps. The Macedonia-UK partnership supports security cooperation, including joint efforts against organized crime, with UK expertise in AI-driven CCTV, drone surveillance, and NATO–Europol patrols integrated into projects to deter illicit activities. Cybersecurity protocols, aligned with the EU’s 2025 Digital Single Market, would protect digital logistics platforms. Historically, weak connectivity enabled banditry; modern infrastructure, bolstered by UK collaboration, must prioritize resilience to ensure sovereignty.The Western Balkans face risks from returning foreign fighters (300 from Macedonia, 2012–2019) and radicalized networks. Secure corridors with rapid-response hubs, supported by UK security expertise, would enhance counterterrorism capabilities. Training border police in NATO protocols and deploying AI-driven threat detection, funded through PPPs and UK-backed loans, would strengthen resilience. Logistics hubs along Corridors 8 and 10 could double as security centers, mirroring Ottoman-era fortified trade routesVIII. Security Integration: Safeguarding ConnectivityImproved transport networks will facilitate rapid military and emergency response, crucial for both national defense and disaster management. Enhanced border infrastructure will help combat illegal migration, smuggling, and organized crime by providing better surveillance and mobility for security forces. Strengthened transport routes will also ensure that critical supply lines remain operational in times of crisis, reducing vulnerabilities to economic and security disruptions.From a NATO integration and regional stability standpoint, a well-connected Macedonia supports NATO’s logistical capabilities by ensuring smooth military mobility across the Balkans. The improved transport corridors will enhance regional cooperation in defense logistics, allowing for faster troop movements and greater supply chain resilience during geopolitical tensions. Additionally, infrastructure linking Macedonia with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece will contribute to stronger regional integration, minimizing the risk of isolation or external influence from non-EU and non-NATO actors.Last but not least, when tackling the energy and supply chain security topic, expanding road and rail links to multiple ports will diversify import and export routes, reducing Macedonia’s reliance on any single country or transit point. This connectivity will enhance trade flexibility and economic resilience, ensuring that the country can maintain stable supply chains even during global economic shocks or regional conflicts. By securing alternative trade and energy routes, Macedonia can protect itself against disruptions that could impact its economy and national stability.IX. Economic Diplomacy: Catalyzing ProsperityConnectivity must be paired with economic diplomacy. Macedonia’s trade profile—importing 95% of its chicken from Brazil—demonstrates global partnership potential. The Macedonia-UK partnership, with £1.7 billion in bilateral trade in 2024, positions Macedonia as a logistics hub, potentially attracting €1.5 billion in FDI in manufacturing, agriculture, and technology by 2035, creating 60,000 jobs. Trade agreements with EU and Balkan partners, facilitated by the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), would enhance market access. Agricultural exports from the Vardar Valley (€700 million in 2024) could increase by 20% with modernized rail links to Burgas and Varna. Engaging EU trade bodies, UK business networks, and regional chambers would ensure compliance and investor confidence.X. Digital Infrastructure: Enabling Smart ConnectivityDigitalization is critical for efficiency and security. Smart customs systems, as piloted in Serbia’s 2023 eCustoms initiative, could reduce border delays by 25%. Real-time freight tracking and multimodal terminals along Corridors 8 and 10, supported by UK technology expertise, would enhance SME competitiveness, aligning with the EU’s eFreight platform. A national digital logistics platform, integrated with EU systems, would streamline trade and improve security. Cybersecurity measures, drawing on NATO’s 2024 Cyber Defence Pledge and UK collaboration, would protect against digital threats, ensuring resilience.XI. Private Sector Engagement: Driving GrowthPrivate sector involvement is essential. The Macedonia-UK partnership aims to increase local company participation in infrastructure projects to over 70%, up from 10-49%, boosting domestic construction competitiveness. Engaging Macedonian firms, such as Pelagonia’s agricultural cooperatives, would drive vertical integration, as seen in potato processing initiatives that boosted exports by 12% in 2020–2023. Subsidies for logistics and green technology firms could attract €700 million in investment. Free trade zones along Corridors 8 and 10, modeled on Albania’s Durres zone, would draw multinationals, creating 25,000 jobs. Public-private dialogues, facilitated by regional chambers and UK business networks, would align projects with market needs.XII. Governance and Institutional FrameworksA Four Seas & River Corridor Commission, comprising government, civil society, and private sector representatives, would coordinate planning, funding, and implementation. Key priorities include:• Harmonized Regulations: Align customs with EU standards to reduce border delays by 20%.
• Cross-Border Committees: Joint bodies with Greece, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Kosovo to oversee development and security, with UK advisory support.
• Transparent PPPs: Leverage EU grants, UK Export Finance loans, and EIB-backed bonds to ensure financial autonomy, as demonstrated by Macedonia’s €150 million Bitola–Kremenica rail project.

XIII. Stakeholder Engagement and Social InclusionInclusive development is critical. Engaging Albanian and Turkish communities in Polog (22% unemployment) through vocational training in logistics and engineering, supported by UK-funded education initiatives, could create 12,000 jobs. Public awareness campaigns, highlighting 50,000 new jobs and 30% lower freight costs, would build consensus. Historically, exclusion fueled tensions; inclusive governance, rooted in the Ohrid Framework, will strengthen unity.XIV. Cultural Diplomacy and National Identity
Connectivity projects can reinforce Macedonian identity. Promoting UNESCO sites like Ohrid along the Via Egnatia corridor would boost tourism (€400 million in 2024) and national pride. Educational programs, including UK-funded initiatives like the medical faculty in Stip, would foster civic engagement. Joint cultural initiatives, such as Balkan heritage festivals, would promote goodwill and counter identity disputes with neighbors.XV. Navigating Great Power DynamicsChina’s BRI, with $19 billion invested in the Balkans, raises EU and NATO concerns about debt and influence. The Macedonia-UK partnership offers a transparent alternative, with favorable loans and no geopolitical strings, aligning with EU and NATO goals. Macedonia must prioritize EIB and EU funding while cautiously engaging China for non-strategic projects. Diplomatic engagement with Germany, Austria, Turkey, and the UK, as seen in Turkey’s $500 million investment in Macedonian energy, would balance partnerships. Concerns about the UK deal signaling a shift from EU integration must be addressed through clear communication of EU alignment.XVI. Environmental Sustainability: A Green VisionSustainability is non-negotiable. Electric rail systems along Corridors 8 and 10, funded by UK loans, could reduce emissions by 25%, aligning with the EU’s Green Deal. Subsidies for eco-friendly transport, modeled on pellet stove incentives that cut rural emissions by 10% in 2018–2022, would support green logistics hubs. Solar-powered terminals would attract eco-conscious investors, ensuring compliance with the EU’s 2030 climate targets.XVII. Cost vs. Strategic ReturnThe €4–5 billion network, funded over 15 years through EU grants, UK loans, PPPs, and EIB bonds, offers transformative returns:
• Economic: 2–3% annual GDP growth, 60,000 jobs, and 25% export growth by 2035, amplified by the UK partnership’s infrastructure investments.
• Security: Diversified corridors and UK-supported security measures reduce vulnerability to geopolitical and non-state threats.
• Diplomacy: Strengthened ties with EU, NATO, UK, and neighbors enhance regional influence.
Inaction has cost €12 billion in lost trade since 1991 (World Bank estimate). Security risks from weak infrastructure demand urgent action.XVIII. Geopolitical Leverage and International CooperationA. EU and NATO Integration
Positioning as a TEN-T node, supported by the Macedonia-UK partnership, aligns with the EU’s €30 billion Western Balkans plan and NATO’s resilience goals. Participation in corridor bodies would unlock €2 billion in funding by 2030.
B. Diversified Partnerships
Prioritizing EU-backed PPPs, UK Export Finance loans, and partnerships with Germany, Austria, Turkey, and the UK ensures transparency. EIB loans, as used in Montenegro’s €1 billion Bar–Boljare highway, would secure sustainable financing.
C. Cross-Border Collaboration
Joint committees with neighbors, advised by UK experts, would harmonize policies and resolve disputes. Including civil society and minorities ensures inclusivity, building on the Ohrid Framework.XIX. Resilience Against Non-State ThreatsUpgrading border facilities with biometric screening and drone surveillance, funded by UK loans, would deter smuggling. Joint training with NATO, Europol, and UK forces would enhance counterterrorism capabilities. Logistics hubs could serve as rapid-response centers, addressing historical vulnerabilities exploited by illicit networks.XX. Addressing ChallengesCritics highlight costs, instability, or corruption risks. EU funding, UK loans, and EIB bonds mitigate financial concerns, though debt risks from the UK deal require oversight. Inclusive governance addresses ethnic tensions, while diversified corridors reduce geopolitical risks. Transparent procurement, overseen by EU auditors, counters corruption. Integrated security measures, supported by the UK, ensure resilience against non-state threats. Speculation about Macedonia hosting UK migrant centers, denied by both governments, must be countered with transparent communication.XXI. Conclusion: A Transformative VisionMacedonia stands at a pivotal moment. By reviving its historical role as a connectivity hub, leveraging the £5 billion Macedonia-UK partnership, the country can overcome landlocked constraints, drive economic prosperity, and enhance regional security. Connecting four seas and the Danube requires bold leadership, inclusive governance, and strategic alignment with EU, NATO, and UK priorities. Drawing on its resilience and historical legacy, Macedonia must act decisively to shape a secure, prosperous, and sustainable future as a regional leader.

Импликациите од затворањето на Ормутскиот теснец врз економијата, трговијата и безбедноста (4 минути читање)

Rabi W. Sédrak - Институт за Меѓународни Стратешки и безбедносни Студии

По нападот на Соединетите Американски Држави врз иранските нуклеарни реактори вчера, иранскиот парламент го одобри затворањето на Ормускиот теснец, но одобрението од Иранскиот совет за безбедност го суспендираше спроведувањето на одлуката. Дали Иран ќе ја спроведе одлукава?Што е значењето на овој теснец? И дали Иран навистина може да го затвори?Ормускиот теснец е најважен воден пат во светот за транспорт на нафта и природен гас, претставувајќи ја неопходната врска помеѓу богатиот со ресурси Арапски/Персиски Залив и отворениот океан. Неговата стратешка локација, граничи и со Иран и со Султанатот Оман, му дава непроценливо значење за глобалната енергетска безбедност и меѓународната трговија.• Анализите покажуваат дека теснецот го олеснува преминувањето на значителен процент од светската поморска нафта, проценета на помеѓу 20% и 30%, и приближно 20-21% од глобалната трговија со течен природен гас. Секој ден, десетици милиони барели нафта и голем број бродови, вклучувајќи супертанкери и товарни бродови, транзитираат низ неговите тесни канали, што ја нагласува огромната густина на сообраќајот.• Теснецот служи како единствена поморска порта за извоз на енергија до сите земји-членки на Советот за соработка во Заливот (GCC) (Саудиска Арабија, Обединетите Арапски Емирати, Катар, Кувајт и Бахреин) и Ирак, како и е клучен за сопствениот извоз на Иран. Азиските економии, особено Кина, Индија, Јапонија и Јужна Кореја, во голема мера се потпираат на енергетските текови низ теснецот, што ги прави особено ранливи на било какви прекини.И покрај повторените закани за затворање од страна на Иран, продолжената или целосна блокада се смета за многу малку веројатна. Оваа проценка се базира на сериозната економска штета што би ја направила Иран на самиот себе и силното одвраќање што би го обезбедува меѓународното поморско присуство, особено Петтата флота на САД. Сепак, делумните прекини или ескалацијата на тензиите би довело до значително и моментално зголемување на глобалните цени на енергијата, зголемување на трошоците за превоз и премиите за осигурување, придонесување за глобалната инфлација и нарушување на синџирите на снабдување (supply chain), што значи потенцијално дестабилизација на глобалната економија. Иако постојат алтернативни нафтоводи за некои производители од Заливот, нивниот вкупен капацитет е недоволен за да ги покрие огромните количини што моментално минуваат низ теснециот, што ја нагласува неговата незаменлива стратешка и комерцијална вредност. Во компаративна анализа со други големи водни патишта, важноста на Ормутскиот теснец за енергетските текови е неспоредлива, дури и ако другите водни патишта, како што е Малачкиот теснец, обработуваат поголем вкупен обем на општа трговија.Вродената кршливост на Ормутскиот теснец длабоко ја нагласува ранливоста на глобалните синџири за снабдување со енергија. Неговиот статус како постојана геополитичка точка на жариште ја истакнува сложената и честопати опасна меѓусебна поврзаност на геополитиката, енергетската безбедност, па дури и пошироките еколошки проблеми, што бара одржливо меѓународно внимание и стратешка предвидливост.Теснецот служел како стратешки глобален енергетски центар и со милениуми бил срцето на меѓународната трговија. Со откривањето на нафтата во 20 век, неговата улога радикално се трансформираше, станувајќи еден од најважните водни патишта на Земјата. Оваа трансформација значително ја зголеми неговата важност, правејќи го една од најчувствителните и стратешки точки на пресврт во светот денес.• Ормутскиот теснец е познат како единствен ефикасен поморски премин што го поврзува Арапскиот Залив со отворениот океан. Оваа единствена географска карактеристика му дава неопходна позиција во глобалната трговија, особено во однос на енергетските текови. Оваа важност доведе до тоа да биде опишан како „вечно буре барут“, што ја одразува неговата нестабилна природа како област подложна на постојан политички и економски притисок.• Еволуцијата на теснецот од општа трговска рута во специјализирана енергетска артерија значи дека неговата стратешка вредност повеќе не е ограничена на чисто комерцијални аспекти; туку, тој стана длабоко испреплетен со глобалната енергетска безбедност и геополитичката стабилност. Описот „буре барут“ укажува дека неговата комерцијална функција станала по природа политизирана.Затоа, секое нарушување тука има непропорционално влијание врз глобалните енергетски пазари, создавајќи мултипликаторски ефект што оди подалеку од обичната трговија. Ова значи дека континуираната важност на теснецот ги надминува неговите географски карактеристики. Неговата стратешка вредност е динамично обликувана од еволутивната глобална побарувачка за енергија и геополитичките промени. Разбирањето на неговата историска трансформација од главен трговски коридор во витална енергетска точка е од суштинско значење за да се разбере зошто тој останува фокус на меѓународна безбедносна загриженост, бидејќи секое нарушување таму би имало длабоки и далекусежни глобални последици.Географските и физичките карактеристики на теснецот ја вклучуваат неговата локација на најисточниот врв на Арапскиот Залив, одвојувајќи го Иран на север од Султанатот Оман (Општина/област Мусандам) и Обединетите Арапски Емирати на југ. Оваа локација претставува витална врска, поврзувајќи ги затворените води на Арапскиот Залив со Оманскиот Залив, а последователно и со Индискиот Океан и Арапското Море.Географските димензии на теснецот малку варираат меѓу изворите, при што неговата должина варира помеѓу приближно 161 километар и 167 километри, а некои проценки може да достигнат приближно 280 километри. Неговата ширина, клучен фактор во неговата навигациска и стратешка важност, се движи помеѓу 34 километри и 39 километри во најтесната точка и може да достигне 50 километри или 96 километри во најшироката. Треба да се напомене дека вистинската бродска лента во најтесната точка не е широка повеќе од 3 километри. Длабочината на теснецот е релативно плитка, ретко надминува 90 метри, иако некои области надминуваат 110 метри на неговиот влез и во неговите изолирани југоисточни делови.Иран и Оман ги сметаат своите крајбрежни држави на теснесот, а неговите води се предмет на нивниот територијален суверенитет. Двете земји ги проширија своите територијални води до средината на 1972 година, ефикасно затворајќи го теснецот за нивните заеднички територијални води. Овој развој предизвика тековни спорови околу правото на транзитен премин за меѓународни бродови.За да се ублажи ризикот од судир во овој тесен, многу прометни водни патишта, бродовите работат со шема за одвојување на сообраќајот (TSS). Оваа шема доделува две ленти, секоја широка две наутички милји, една за влезни и една за излезни бродови, одделени со тампон зона од две наутички милји.Географската тесност на теснецот е меч со две острици. Од една страна, го прави природна пречка, теоретски олеснувајќи им на крајбрежните држави да ја контролираат или нарушат пловидбата. Фактот дека Иран и Оман ги сметаат своите води за територијални, обезбедува правна основа за таква контрола, Иран постојано се заканува дека ќе го затвори. Од друга страна, заедно со огромниот обем на бродски сообраќај, создава по природа средина со висок ризик. Оваа кршливост се протега надвор од намерните дејствија и вклучува потенцијални несреќи, кои би можеле да имаат катастрофални глобални последици. Иако системот за одвојување на сообраќајот е техничко решение за избегнување судири, тој малку прави за ублажување на геополитичките ризици.Ова значи дека географските карактеристики на теснецот, покрај законските барања на државите што граничат со него, создаваат постојана тензија помеѓу националниот суверенитет и глобалната зависност. Оваа вродена кршливост, и покрај присуството на софистицирани навигациски системи, ја нагласува постојаната потреба од силна меѓународна соработка, дипломатски ангажман и напори за деескалација за одржување на стабилноста во регионот. Комерцијалното значење на теснецот како животна линија за глобалната трговија со енергија е очигледно.Ормутскиот теснец е неоспорно најважната точка во светот за транспорт на нафта. Неговото огромно комерцијално значење е демонстрирано со обемот на енергетски текови што минуваат низ него дневно и годишно. Теснецот го олеснува преминувањето на приближно 20% до 30% од глобалната трговија со нафта по море. Во однос на вкупната глобална потрошувачка или производство на нафта, некои анализи покажуваат дека тој носи речиси 40% од глобалната трговија со сурова нафта.Количината на нафта што дневно поминува низ теснецот е зачудувачка. Во 2024 година, дневниот обем на транспортирана нафта изнесуваше 20,3 милиони барели. Други бројки вклучуваат 16,5 милиони барели дневно во 2024 година, 17 милиони барели дневно во 2011 година, 20-21 милион барели дневно и просек од 20,9 милиони барели дневно во 2023 година. Од јануари до октомври 2023 година, приближно 16 милиони барели сурова нафта дневно поминале низ теснецот.Покрај нафтата, тесенцот е подеднакво важен за трговијата со природен гас. Тој обработува повеќе од една петтина (20%) до 21% од глобалната трговија со течен природен гас (LNG) годишно. Поважно е што целиот извоз на LNG од Катар и ОАЕ, кои заедно сочинуваат 20% од глобалната трговија со LNG, мора да помине низ теснецот, и нема одржливи алтернативни средства за испорака на овие количини на глобалните пазари. Катар, особено, е втор по големина извозник на LNG во светот, што ја прави оваа зависност критична. Во 2024 година, 290 милиони кубни метри течен природен гас (LNG) минувале низ теснецот дневно. Само извозот на Катар достигна речиси 90 милијарди кубни метри во првите десет месеци од 2023 година.Иако енергијата доминира во важноста на теснецот, неговото комерцијално значење се протега и на други стоки. Приближно 22% од светските стоки, вклучувајќи ги и основните производи како жито, железна руда и цемент, исто така минуваат низ овој воден пат. Ова го истакнува неговото пошироко влијание врз глобалните синџири на снабдување надвор од јаглеводородите.Огромните податоци за обемот на нафта и гас јасно ја нагласуваат фундаменталната улога на теснецот во енергетскиот сектор. Сепак, експлицитното упатување на „22% од стоките“ открива пошироко, честопати потценето, комерцијално значење. Ова сугерира дека секое нарушување нема да биде ограничено на енергетска криза, туку би предизвикало поширока криза во синџирот на снабдување што ќе влијае на различни стоки, потенцијално влијаејќи врз безбедноста на храната и индустриското производство на глобално ниво. Понатаму, единствената и критична кршливост на пазарите на LNG, особено за Катар и ОАЕ, поради целосниот недостаток на алтернативни патишта, ги разликува од нафтата, каде што постојат малку алтернативи за цевководи. Ова го прави пазарот на течен природен гас (LNG) непропорционално почувствителен на нарушувањата на Хормускиот теснец.Како закличок, можеме да констатираме дека теснецот е многу повеќе од само „нафтена точка на задушување“; туку е системска или основна врска на глобалната трговија низ повеќе витални сектори. Затоа, неговото нарушување би предизвикало повеќеслојна криза, истовремено влијаејќи на енергетските пазари, цените на стоките и потенцијално пошироката економска нестабилност, протегајќи се надвор од директната цена на нафтата. Ова го прави теснецот како критична системска точка истовремено ризична за целата глобална економија. Нешто што не верувам дека глобалните сили ќе го голтнат затварањето без никакви серјозни реакции.